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 Mladen Dragasevic 
The Newest Old State in Europe 
Montenegro Regaining Independence 
Introduction 
There is no small nation without a great history. Montenegrin people are a 
perfect example to confirm this rule. However, this paper is not about the 
thousand-year history of Montenegro, the fierce struggles this small but 
fearless nation had during its fights for freedom and independence. It is 
about the most important features of the political situation in Montenegro 
after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of 
the different unions with Serbia. This paper deals with the origins of the 
independence movement in Montenegro in the last decade, tries to explain 
the arguments in favour and against independence, as well as the possible 
implications of the process, looked upon from different perspectives inside 
and outside of Montenegro. Furthermore, it deals with the European Un-
ion’s involvement in the issue, the reasons behind the specific EU policy 
towards Montenegro and its effects.  
1. Montenegro’s historical background: From Duklja to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
1.1. General history 
Montenegro is a mountainous Balkan country of rough beauty, located on 
the Adriatic coast. The history of Montenegro is the history of wars and Mladen Dragasevic 
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battles, fought against foreign domination. The first Montenegrin state, 
Duklja, gained its freedom in 1042, having won a decisive battle against 
Byzantium. Montenegro has been the only Balkan country that stood free 
and independent throughout centuries, having resisted constant foreign at-
tempts of invasion. Outstanding leaders of the Crnojevic and Petrovic dy-
nasties governed Montenegro for centuries. The Crnojevic dynasty ruled 
Montenegro until 1516 and Orthodox Bishops of the Petrovic dynasty were 
leading the country up to 1851. Montenegro became a kingdom in 1910. 
King Nikola of Montenegro was to be the only Montenegrin king, due to 
the unconstitutional and hostile annexation of Montenegro by Serbia in 
1918. The same year, the Kingdom of the South Slavs had been established 
under the realm of the Serbian king Aleksandar Karadjordjevic. 
In the period between the two World Wars, King Aleksandar dominated the 
Yugoslav Government. Despite being a grandson of Montenegro's king Ni-
kola, he worked against the ideas of Montenegro as an independent state. 
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, on the other hand, supported the 
equality of the Montenegrin nation (with Serbs, Croats and others), in rec-
ognition of the desire of the majority of Montenegrins who fought in World 
War II for liberation and emancipation. This made the Communist party 
popular in Montenegro; Belgrade, however, regarded Montenegro as a 
mere backward province during the reign of the Karadjordjevic monarchy 
in the First Yugoslavia. Tito's Partisans won the war of liberation and ac-
knowledged Montenegro's massive contribution to the war against the Axis 
Powers and its desire for a renewed status by establishing it as one of the 
six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
The Montenegrins' traditional Pan-Slavism made them inclined to support 
the communist project of reunifying Yugoslavia. Consequently, after the 
war many Montenegrins found themselves in high positions within the 
military, political, and economic administration, in contrast to their former 
marginality. Montenegro, regarded as an under-developed republic, became 
a regular recipient of large quantities of federal aid, which enabled it to 
embark – for the first time – on a process of industrialization. Furthermore, 
at the beginning of the 1980s, the Montenegrin coast emerged as an impor-
tant tourist area. The Newest Old State in Europe 
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1.2. The dissolution of the former and the rise of the new Yugoslavia 
No East European country has demonstrated so clearly as the former Yugo-
slavia the dangers inherent but largely unrecognized in the process of de-
mocratization. The central conflict, which destabilized Yugoslavia, was 
between, on the one hand, the desire to create or consolidate (in the case of 
Serbia) a state in which one national group was dominant, and on the other, 
the perceived or demonstrable vulnerability of populations in these pro-
jected states, which led to their growing aspirations for independence. With 
a largely homogeneous ethnic composition, Slovenia was able to secede 
after a war which, when compared with what was to come in other FRY 
Republics, was peaceful. Almost everywhere else, a plethora of minorities 
inhabited the disputed territories: in Croatia, in Bosnia, in Serbia, in Mace-
donia. Only in Montenegro was the issue of minorities uncontentious.  
For a long time (until just before the declarations of independence of Croa-
tia and Slovenia in June 1991), Western Europe and the United States ap-
peared unwilling to recognize that Yugoslavia was disintegrating and that 
the presidents of its six republics were not capable of regulating this proc-
ess in a peaceful manner. The overall developments of the democratization 
process in Yugoslavia demonstrated that the rhetoric of self-determination 
could not be easily translated into practice. This dichotomy lead to the use 
of force and created the dilemma in the international community as to how 
to react to the independence claims by the various Yugoslav republics. 
The break-up of the Yugoslav federation after 1989 left Montenegro in an 
acutely precarious position. The first democratic elections in 1990 brought 
the reformed League of Communists to power, confirming Montenegrin 
support for the disintegrating federation. On the other hand, in 1989 the 
remains of King Nikola and other members of the former royal family were 
returned to Montenegro to be re-entered with great ceremony in Cetinje
1. 
This event fostered independence sentiments, re-emerging in some circles 
of the Montenegrin society, after being repressed by two Yugoslavias. The 
idea of Montenegro as an independent state had been vigorously pro-
 
1   Old royal capital of Montenegro. Mladen Dragasevic 
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claimed by a group of intellectuals gathered in the Liberal Alliance of 
Montenegro, one of the opposition parties in the Montenegrin Parliament. 
The young leaders of the League of Communists of Montenegro, Milo 
Djukanovic, Momir Bulatovic and Svetozar Marovic, all swept into power 
during the so-called "anti-bureaucratic revolution" – an administrative 
putsch of sorts within the Yugoslav Communist party, orchestrated by Slo-
bodan Milosevic. All three appeared devout communists on the surface, but 
they also had sufficient skills and adaptability to understand the dangers of 
clinging to traditional, rigid old-guard tactics in new and changing times. 
When the old Yugoslavia effectively ceased to exist and the democratic 
political system had been introduced, they quickly repackaged the Monte-
negrin branch of the old Communist party and renamed it the Democratic 
Party of Socialists (DPS). Inheriting the entire infrastructure, resources and 
membership of the old Communist party gave the DPS a sizable head start 
on their opponents of the newly-formed parties. It allowed them to win par-
liamentary and presidential elections overwhelmingly. The party has ruled 
Montenegro ever since (either alone or as a leading member of different 
ruling coalitions), never losing power for even a day. 
On December 16, 1991, the EC Foreign Ministers met in Brussels and is-
sued a ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’. This document significantly influenced 
international reactions on the issue of recognition of the newly emerging 
states and, arguably, transformed recognition law. The Declaration on 
Yugoslavia introduced a process for applying the guidelines, which re-
quired any Republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) to apply for recognition. The written applications would then be 
submitted for advice to the Arbitration Commission, better known as the 
Badinter Commission
2. The Badinter Commission explained from a rela-
tively theoretical point of view the conditions whereby a national entity had 
the right of secession, meaning that all former republics of the SFRY (Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) 
 
2   The Arbitration Commission of the European Community, established at a peace 
conference on Yugoslavia (November 29, 1991), comprised five presidents from 
different Constitutional Courts of the EC countries; it became known as the 
Badinter Commission after the French lawyer appointed as its president. The Newest Old State in Europe 
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were entitled to statehood. This method of requiring an application for rec-
ognition, which is examined by an arbitrator and then decided upon accord-
ing to a set timetable, was virtually unprecedented in recognition practice. 
The invitation by the EC, extended to all six Republics of the SFRY, 
showed no uniformity in the responses or the results whatsoever.  
On February 12, 1992, governments of Serbia and Montenegro agreed to 
remain in the same state, named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), which claimed continuity with the SFRY. Montenegro than hastily 
organized a referendum on state status on March 1, 1992. In this, the first 
referendum for Montenegrin independence, 95.96% of the votes were cast 
for remaining in the federation with Serbia. The turnout was 66%
3 because 
of the boycott by the pro-independence Montenegrins as well as the Mus-
lim and Catholic minorities. Proponents of independence claim that the poll 
was organized under undemocratic conditions, with widespread propa-
ganda from the state-controlled media in favour of a pro-federation vote.  
The international community rejected the Belgrade government’s efforts to 
establish the FRY as a successor of the SFRY. The Badinter Commission 
ruled that none of the six successor states of the SFRY could claim for it-
self alone the membership rights previously enjoyed by the former SFRY. 
The four former SFRY republics – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, and Macedonia – decided to apply for membership in international 
organizations and since then have been recognized by the international 
community and admitted as members of the UN. But while President Mil-
osevic was in power, first as the President of Serbia (1989-1997), then as 
the President of the FRY (1997-2000), the FRY refused to apply for mem-
bership in international organizations. The FRY considered itself the sole 
successor state of the SFRY, and therefore believed that it was automati-
cally entitled to positions in international organizations previously occu-
pied by the SFRY. The result was the partial exclusion from the activities 
of the UN and the suspension from other international organizations. This 
absurd situation of perpetuating the memory of a non-existent state lasted 
for eight years. 
 
3   http://www.tanjug.co.yu/Dogadjaji/referendum/default.aspx. Mladen Dragasevic 
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2. Montenegro inside the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via  
2.1. The tension rises: Conflicts in the new Yugoslavia  
Despite the ethnic, religious and linguistic similarities between Serbs and 
Montenegrins, differences between the national interests of Montenegro 
and Serbia were growing. Montenegro increasingly felt the consequences 
of international sanctions imposed on the FRY, banning it from member-
ship in international financial organizations, and harming its own economy 
and international standing. In response, Montenegro began to press for 
greater political autonomy from Serbia and initiated a process of dissocia-
tion from the federal institutions in 1997. The whole process was similar to 
the situation from the early 90’s, i.e. the Slovenian and Croatian separation. 
The main difference is that the conflict between Belgrade and Podgorica 
was primarily political and does not have an ethnic dimension.  
In 1996, a pro-western faction of the political elite within the DPS, under 
the leadership of Milo Djukanovic, began to openly propagate a different 
economic and foreign policy from that of the federal government led by the 
Milosevic supporters. In contrast to Momir Bulatovic, his opponent within 
the DPS, Djukanovic rapidly adopted western values and came to lead a 
new generation of young technocrats. Djukanovic’s prime objective was 
the economic development of Montenegro through cooperation, leading 
eventually to integration in Western European organizations. However, 
Djukanovic dared to express open criticism of Milosevic. According to 
Djukanovic, the international image of Milosevic was so bad that his elec-
tion as president of the FRY could only further damage the interests of the 
Yugoslav federation, and thus of Montenegro.  
The conflict between Djukanovic, on the one-side, and Bulatovic and Mil-
osevic on the other came to a head in the summer of 1997, when Djukano-
vic decided to challenge Bulatovic in the presidential elections scheduled 
for October 1997. It ended with Milo Djukanović winning over Momir Bu-
latović in a second-round run-off. Former close allies had by this time be-
come bitter foes, which resulted in the splitting of the DPS. Bulatovic and The Newest Old State in Europe 
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his followers formed the Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP), 
staying loyal to Milosevic, whereas Djukanovic began to distance himself 
further from Serbia. This distance from the policies of Milosevic played a 
decisive role in sparing Montenegro from the heavy bombing that Serbia 
endured in the spring of 1999 during the NATO air-campaign. 
Djukanović turned out to be the winner of this political fight, and his posi-
tion was strengthened by the parliamentary elections held on May 31, 1998. 
Having won the parliamentary elections, the DPS candidate should have 
been assigned federal prime minister. Instead, President Milosevic chose 
Momir Bulatovic, who was defeated in the election, for this post. The DPS 
considered Bulatovic’s appointment unconstitutional. From that moment 
on, the Government of Montenegro (GoM) and President Djukanovic re-
fused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the federal institutions; thus the 
federation became dysfunctional.  
Djukanovic’s double victory represented the most serious challenge to Mil-
osevic’s rule since he had become president of the FRY. Under Djukano-
vic’s leadership, Montenegro tended to assume important state 
competencies at the expense of the federal institutions. This political strat-
egy was Montenegro’s response to an openly hostile attitude of Milosevic, 
who considered the federal state to be in the service of Serbian state inter-
ests. He simply ignored Montenegro’s attempts to formulate separate inter-
ests, to which it was entitled as an equal member of the federation. 
As a consequence, the GoM established its strategy of dissociation with 
regard to the federal institutions. It gradually built up the institutional ca-
pacities of a sovereign state, taking over the monetary and banking system, 
foreign trade, customs and taxation. Montenegro introduced the Deutsche 
Mark as a currency on November 2, 1999, thus reducing the influence of 
the Yugoslav Central Bank on its economy. Since the introduction of the 
Euro in 2002, all payments and transactions in Montenegro have been 
changed accordingly. This meant that monetary union in FRY ceased to 
exist and its unified market met additional obstacles. GoM had taken other 
attributes of sovereign policy as well, such as the control of the customs 
regime, the creation of a distinct visa regime and internal security.  Mladen Dragasevic 
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2.2. Post-Milosevic’s era: Widening the gap   
The removal of Slobodan Milosevic from power in October 2000 was re-
ceived in the Montenegrin political public, as expected, with unconcealed 
relief, but also with considerable reservation towards the new president of 
the FRY Vojislav Kostunica. Democratic forces in Montenegro assessed 
that the citizens of Serbia and the Serbian opposition elite achieved a big 
success with the victory over the great bastion of dictatorship. Neverthe-
less, they asserted that this was just the first step in the democratic trans-
formation of Serbia, in which positive political energy had been suppressed 
for a long time. 
It was clear from the beginning that the positions of President Djukanovic 
and the GoM concerning a new union are quite different from those of Kos-
tunica and the DOS. The GoM stated that Serbia and Montenegro ought to 
constitute themselves into two independent sovereign states before entering 
into negotiations on restructuring the federal state. In addition, Montenegro 
made claims for two seats in the UN and separate memberships in interna-
tional organizations. President Djukanovic suggested that the new Union 
between Serbia and Montenegro should have only three functions in com-
mon: defence, common market and foreign affairs. These demands repre-
sented the official position of the GoM for the forthcoming negotiations 
with the Serbian Government and the federal presidency. The Montenegrin 
negotiating platform envisaged a referendum to seek popular approval for a 
solution or, if the negotiations failed, for independence. 
The President of the FRY, Vojislav Kostunica, stated on many occasions 
that one of his main priorities was to restructure the federal state and to 
keep the two states together. It is interesting to notice that all of the main 
political parties in Serbia, apart from great discrepancy in their political 
agendas, were in favour of maintaining a certain kind of state union. Ac-
cording to Kostunica, the union between Serbia and Montenegro should 
have a single legal personality in international relations and one seat in the 
UN. The union should also have a joint federal government, one president, 
a single army, a single currency and a common foreign policy. The Newest Old State in Europe 
  11
The first negotiating session between Kostunica, Djukanovic and Djindjic 
(Serbian Prime Minister) in January 2001 was inconclusive. Both sides 
clung to their respective platforms. The first price for the evident disagree-
ment was the stability of the Montenegrin governing coalition. The Pro-
union Peoples Party (NS) left the government and joined the opposition. 
Early parliamentary elections in the Republic of Montenegro were the only 
way out to break the political jam caused by the disintegration of the ruling 
coalition. This crucial question of Montenegro’s legal status mobilized 
82% of eligible voters, who took part in the elections held on April 22, 
2001.  
The pro-independence coalition led by Djukanovic won the election. Nev-
ertheless, the newly elected government was not to last very long. Under 
great pressure from the European Union (see Chapter 3.1.), the GoM 
signed the Belgrade Agreement, establishing the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro. The strongly pro-independent Liberal Alliance of Montenegro 
(LSCG) pulled out of the ruling coalition in protest, triggering new elec-
tions. LSCG's urge to punish Djukanovic for the “treason” of the Belgrade 
Agreement was so powerful, that the party formed a strange alliance with 
the federalist bloc. The voters, however, clearly expressed their support for 
the political realism embodied in the Belgrade Agreement, extending the 
ruling coalition’s mandate.  
Djukanovic's victory has left the pro-union parties too discredited to form a 
serious and vibrant opposition. Indeed, some time will pass before such an 
opposition will arise.  
3. The EU’s apprehension and intervention 
3.1. Building the State Union 
Having learnt the lessons of its failure to intervene in the Balkan crises dur-
ing the 90’s – especially in Bosnia and Kosovo – the EU was trying to be 
much more efficient in preventing new conflicts in the region. Not being 
able to find a timely agreement among its member states and institutions 
for a solution of the newly emerged problems, the EU had to bear the mas-Mladen Dragasevic 
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sive costs of providing urgent help to the war-destroyed areas in former 
Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the 21st century, the EU was determined 
not to allow more armed conflicts of any kind in the Western Balkans, 
which almost have a certain place in the EU in the future.  
After the fall of Milosevic’ regime, an overwhelming majority of the EU’s 
main political actors favoured the concept of a joint state. This standpoint 
was firmly supported by the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier 
Solana. Washington and Brussels met with disapproval the Montenegrin 
proposal for dissolution of the two states in a Czechoslovak-style “Velvet 
Divorce”.
4 Montenegro began to seem more like a troublemaker than a reli-
able ally to the EU and the US. The EU's solution was to push for a rear-
rangement of relations between Montenegro and Serbia on completely new 
foundations, but in the setting of what would remain, for diplomatic and 
international purposes, one single political entity.  
After pressuring Montenegro in various ways, the EU managed to persuade 
Podgorica to sign the Belgrade Agreement on March 14, 2002, creating a 
tailor-made entity named the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a con-
juncture of two semi-independent states. On February 4, 2003, the Parlia-
ment of the FRY adopted “The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro”. The Constitutional Charter enabled the estab-
lishment of institutions like the Parliament, the President, the Council of 
Ministers and the Court of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.  
The main task of the institutions of the State Union was to carry out the 
joint functions of two states: a common foreign policy, a free trade area and 
the command of the Army. In practice, things were developing in a differ-
ent direction. The diplomatic-consular representatives of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro (especially Montenegrin diplomats) were pursuing the policies of 
their own governments. Many obstacles disabled the proper functioning of 
a joint market: the existence of two central banks and two different curren-
cies; different systems of taxation; divergences in foreign trade and cus-
 
4   The Montenegrin proposal envisaged two new states– Montenegro and Serbia – 
each as an independent and internationally recognized sovereign entity, in an asso-The Newest Old State in Europe 
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toms and excise systems. The international community started to realize 
significant obstacles to the effective functioning of the union. Appropriate 
reactions followed. The World Trade Organisation allowed the two entities 
to join separately and to be considered as two economic systems. Recognis-
ing the logjam between the two states, the European Commission adopted a 
twin track approach in negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) in September 2004. It envisaged a single SAA with two 
separate economic annexes – one for Montenegro and one for Serbia. 
The politicians in the EU were becoming more aware of the fact that the 
Belgrade Agreement perhaps was a success in terms of crisis preven-
tion/postponement, but it had not, by far, laid the foundations for a stable, 
long-term union. The GoM, strengthened by the growing pro-independent 
feeling among the people of Montenegro, was determined to use the option 
provided in Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter: “Upon the expiry of a 
3-year period, member states shall have the right to initiate the proceedings 
for the change in its state status or for breaking away from the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro. The decision on breaking away from the state 
union of Serbia and Montenegro shall be taken following a referendum.“
5 
By the beginning of 2006, nobody was denying the legal right of the ruling 
coalition in Montenegro to consult the people on the idea of an independent 
state in a democratic and fair referendum. 
3.2. The Law on the Referendum: 55% democracy  
While the Belgrade Agreement’s three year moratorium was expiring, dis-
cussions on the Referendum law were increasing. The biggest obstacle in 
the negotiations was the discussion about the percentage of the electorate 
necessary for legitimately proclaiming an independent state. The GoM was 
willing to agree upon 40% of overall electoral body (for legitimately pro-
claiming an independent state), while the opposition asked for 60%. Firm 
 
ciation somewhat similar to the arrangements that bind together the various mem-
bers of the European Union. 
5    The Constitutional Charter of the State Community of Serbia and Montenegro, 
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/const_scg.pdf. Mladen Dragasevic 
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positions of the two parties led to the stalemate which needed a solution 
from outside.  
EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, appointed Slovak diplo-
mat Miroslav Lajcak as a mediator and his personal representative for the 
Montenegrin referendum. Soon after he was appointed, Ambassador Lajcak 
put forward a “proposal” the EU found best for the situation in Montene-
gro: for the referendum to be declared valid, the turnout had to be over 50% 
of those on electoral lists. In addition, independence had to be approved by 
at least 55% of citizens who took part in voting. The reasons behind the 
EU’s proposal were complex.    
The EU’s political concept towards Serbia and Montenegro had been clear 
in recent years. The EU preferred the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro, 
and made specific political steps in this direction, starting with the tremen-
dous influence on Montenegro in times of negotiating the Belgrade Agree-
ment, up to the exceptional 55% rule. There are a number of justified 
concerns of the EU with respect to the effects of the eventual proclamation 
of Montenegrin independence: 
•  Internal destabilisation of Montenegro: public opinion, almost equally 
divided over two concepts of the status, could lead to yet another inter-
nal conflict in the unstable area of the Western Balkans. 
•  Undermining democratic progress in Serbia: the independence of Mon-
tenegro would strengthen nationalist positions in the Serbian Parliament, 
and jeopardize the already fragile democratic government in Belgrade. 
•  Domino effect in the region: an independent Montenegro would fire 
separatism in the surrounding countries, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The EU was afraid of the idea that the process might 
provoke Albanian leaders to proclaim the independence of Kosovo, in 
the middle of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over its status. 
•  The future impact of yet another small state on the distribution of voting 
power within the EU.  
The GoM, being aware of the reasons behind the EU’s support for a state 
union, made considerable diplomatic efforts in providing adequate counter-The Newest Old State in Europe 
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arguments. It was promoting the firm determination and efficiency of Mon-
tenegrin institutions in preventing any possible internal conflict in the 
country, stressing the significant role cultural, traditional, religious and 
family ties between the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro could play in a 
peaceful separation. Podgorica constantly repeated its intention for the 
closest possible cooperation in various fields between independent states in 
the future. Furthermore, the GoM refused to be directly involved in the 
resolution of the Kosovo issue. The historical, moral and legitimate right of 
Montenegro to claim independence has not been disputed by the interna-
tional community since the Berlin Congress in 1878. The countries in the 
region made substantial steps to improve security conditions: Macedonia 
overcame its internal ethnic conflict and gained the status of EU member-
ship candidate, Bosnia and Herzegovina was finalising the process of 
adopting the new constitution and is moving forward in the process of ne-
gotiations on the SAA. Finally, Montenegro will not be the smallest coun-
try in the EU (Luxemburg, Malta), and it is difficult to imagine that 
670,000 Montenegrins will challenge the absorption capacity of the EU. 
Nevertheless, the referendum conditions (55% of votes cast) had been im-
mediately heavily criticized by pro-independence media in Montenegro. 
This major exception of the majority rule represented a potential risk for a 
clear political outcome. By accepting this condition imposed by those who 
refused Montenegrin independence – European diplomacy, in contempt of 
the elementary rules of representative democracy and the right of people to 
decide for themselves – could be accused of having created an inextricable 
situation.  
Indeed, if over half of voters – but less than 55% of them – were to vote in 
favour of independence, Montenegro would have remained united with 
Serbia and the minority would have won over the majority! In order to win, 
supporters of the union with Serbia were therefore not obliged to win the 
referendum, it was sufficient for them not to lose with too large a gap. 
Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic declared, “The recommendation from the 
European Union is dangerous for stability. The 55/45 ratio is contrary to 
the very principle of democracy. The final decision should lie with the ma-Mladen Dragasevic 
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jority and not the minority. In my opinion this is unfair, but we will accept 
the European Union’s proposal.” 
On March 1, 2006, the Montenegrin Parliament adopted the Law on the 
Referendum on Independence by 60 votes in favour and 10 against. Pro-
independent parties (except DPS) were against the Law because of their 
disapproval of the 55% rule.  
4. Montenegro on the Way to the Referendum 
4.1. The discourse on independence: Arguments in favour and 
against independence  
“Do you want the Republic of Montenegro to be an independent state with 
full international and legal personality?” This is the question, which the 
Montenegrins answered on May 21, 2006, and determined their country’s 
fate. Both the pro-independence bloc and the pro-union bloc started their 
campaigns confident of victory.  
The independence bloc headed by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, who 
connected his political fate with the referendum outcome
6, was a multi-
ethnic coalition comprising the governing parties, which held 44 out of 74 
seats in the Montenegrin Parliament. In the referendum campaign, the in-
dependence bloc extensively used the passionate sentiment among Monte-
negrins towards the long-lasting fierce battle for sovereignty. It proclaimed 
that the experience of different types of state union showed that relations 
with Serbia cannot be transparent, lasting and stable unless the two states 
are independent or they form a tight political union. The “independentists” 
strongly accentuated the fact that Serbia was holding Montenegro back in 
the process of European integration, especially after the European Com-
mission suspended the SAA negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro on 
May 3, 2006, due to the insufficient cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY in 
 
6   Prime Minister Djukanovic declared that if the independence option acquired less 
than 50%, he would resign. The Newest Old State in Europe 
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The Hague. Thus, Montenegro, once again, suffered the consequences of 
the political decisions it was unable to influence. 
Independentists based their argument on the achievements Montenegro 
made in improving its political and economic policies. The developed mul-
tiethnic and multi-religious character of the Republic has been pointed out 
as one of its basic values that distinguished Montenegro in a regional and 
wider international context. Different confessions and ethnic groups, which 
have been living together in this region for centuries, represented a true 
recognition of the key principle of the European Union’s “Living together 
in diversity”.  
The independence block argued that Montenegro wanted to take its future 
in its own hands, to build its independent European road, simultaneously 
developing good relations with all the neighbouring countries, including 
Serbia and Kosovo. In the SAA negotiations, Montenegro affirmed good 
coordination of its institutions and developed clear negotiation positions. 
Independent Montenegro will be a good example of dynamic economic in-
tegration into the EU, with its opened economic system, with excellent 
natural resources and qualified workforce, together with the high level of 
achieved economic reforms. Furthermore, Montenegro, as an independent 
state, would have a larger scope of the financial support provided from 
European funds and programmes for the accessing countries. Following the 
introduction of the twin track model, funds from the CARDS programme 
intended for Montenegro were increased from 8% in 2003 to approximately 
12% in 2005. This will also be the case when accessing the IPA instru-
ments, in 2007.  
The pro-union bloc headed by the main opposition leader Predrag Bula-
tovic
7 was mainly an Orthodox coalition, which held 30 seats in the Par-
liament. The campaign of the pro-union block stressed the proximity 
between the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples, and their great historic, tra-
ditional, religious and family ties. Unionists expressed concerns in the case 
of independence for the status of the Serbs in Montenegro (197,000) and 
 
7   Similar to the Prime Minister, President of the SNP Predrag Bulatovic declared that 
if the independence option won more than 55% of the vote, he would leave politics. Mladen Dragasevic 
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the Montenegrins in Serbia (263,000). They explained positive economic 
effects of the State Union by taking the stand that independence would de-
prive Montenegro of its access to Serbian markets, and that the tourist 
business would collapse because of the reduction of tourists from Serbia. 
Backed by the EU’s support of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
pro-unionist politicians claimed that union with Serbia is still the quickest 
way to join the European Union. They targeted Djukanovic, whom they 
accused of wanting to create a “private state” for himself and his wealthy 
inner circle. They invited every opponent to the “regime” to vote against 
independence. The unionist block had significant support from both the 
government and the opposition in Belgrade. During the referendum cam-
paign there was a widespread pressure from the Serbian media on the lead-
ers of the independence block. In addition, Serbian Government officials 
threatened with imposing barriers on an independent state of Montenegro 
and its citizens (e.g. abolishing workers’ and students’ rights, health insur-
ance, introducing passports and special visa regime). 
Serbia was against the independence of its neighbour for several reasons. 
The stakes were not only psychological or about identity; they were also 
geo-political and strategic. For the Serbs, Montenegro represented the Ser-
bia’s only remaining access to the sea after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
The date of the referendum did not suit Belgrade, since Serbia was, at the 
time, negotiating the future status of Kosovo, a province administered by 
the UN, whose mainly Albanian population demanded independence. Ser-
bia feared that a possible independence of Montenegro might set a prece-
dent for Kosovo, or even Vojvodina, another province of Serbia with a high 
percentage of inhabitants of Hungarian nationality.  
4.2. Discussing the post-referendum situation: Montenegro’s initia-
tive 
Both political sides in the Republic of Montenegro showed firm intention 
towards organising the referendum on the future state status of the Republic 
of Montenegro according to the highest democratic international standards. 
They agreed to accept the results of the fair and democratic referendum, 
once again confirming the solid democratic course of Montenegrin society.  The Newest Old State in Europe 
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During the pre-referendum campaign, the GoM offered to begin nego-
tiation with the Government of Serbia on the future arrangements of the 
relations between the two states, regardless of the outcome of the referen-
dum. Leaders in Belgrade repeatedly expressed unwillingness to start the 
negotiations, justifying their position with the argument that they did not 
want to prejudge the outcome of the referendum.  
Certainly, the most discussed question in the whole process was what will 
happen if the independent block wins simple, but not the qualified majority 
according to the EU rule, for example, 54 % of the votes? Will it calmly 
accept the fact that they lost the race by 1%, even though they won support 
of a clear majority of the electoral body? In that case, the EU’s 55% 
threshold, which aimed to prevent political instability in Montenegro, could 
in the end possibly foster instability, albeit of a different kind. And after all, 
if there were any unrest of this kind, what would be the European remedy? 
The so-called “grey zone”, (the result between 50%-55% in favour of inde-
pendence) would merely postpone the resolution of the problem, for per-
haps another 3 years, but it would not bring the much needed political 
stability to the country, nor to the region of Western Balkans. 
Nevertheless, Montenegrin leadership was looking forward to the clear win 
at the referendum, a win over 55%, which would leave no room for objec-
tion. In the expectation of this outcome, the GoM adopted specific strategy 
papers and declarations, including the Action Plan of the Priority Activities 
for Functioning of Montenegro as an Independent State, the Declaration on 
Relations with the Republic of Serbia after Gaining Independence, the Dec-
laration on Making the EU Accession Process More Dynamic and the Dec-
laration on the Relations with the United Nations. 
The most recent survey of public opinion before the referendum, conducted 
by the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM), a Montenegrin 
NGO, showed that the estimated turnout on the referendum would be 87%, 
out of which 56.3% of the votes would be in favour of independence, with 
43.7% against.
8 
 
8   http://www.cedem.cg.yu/opolls/images/CEDEM_april06_eng.pdf. Mladen Dragasevic 
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4.3. The outcome of the referendum: looking to the future 
The status of the union between Montenegro and Serbia was decided by a 
referendum on Montenegrin independence on May 21, 2006. A total of 
419.240 votes were cast, representing 86.5% of the total electorate. 230.661 
votes or 55.5% were in favour of independence and 185.002 votes or 
44.5% were against. The difference of 45.659 votes narrowly surpassed the 
55% threshold needed to validate the referendum under the rules set by the 
European Union. According to the Republic Referendum Commission, the 
55% threshold was passed by only 2.300 votes.
9 The first state to recognise 
Montenegro was Iceland, on  June 8, 2006, followed by Serbia, the mem-
ber-states of the European Union, and the permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council, virtually removing any obstacles from 
Montenegro's path towards becoming the world's newest sovereign state.  
The 2006 referendum was monitored by 5 international observing missions, 
headed by an OSCE/ODIHR Monitoring Team, and around 3,000 observ-
ers in total (including domestic). The International Referendum Observa-
tion Mission in its preliminary report “assessed compliance of the 
referendum process with OSCE commitments, Council of Europe commit-
ments, other international standards for democratic electoral processes, and 
domestic legislation”.
10 
On June 3, 2006, the Parliament of Montenegro declared the independence 
of Montenegro, formally confirming the result of the referendum on inde-
pendence. Montenegro has begun the process of seeking international rec-
ognition as well as a seat at international organizations. 
 
9   http://www.rrk.cg.yu/. 
10  http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/19150_en.pdf.html. ZEI DISCUSSION PAPER:   Bisher erschienen / Already published: 
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